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War In Europe -- Down The Slippery Slope Editorial: After 18 days of bombing, NATO seems farther from achieving its goals in Kosovo that Milosevic is to achieving his. The prospect of NATO ground troops looks increasingly likely, and with it the threat of a wider war in Europe.  By Michael Lindemann Start Date: 4/10/99 Editorial Commentary: As this is written, the air war over Yugoslavia is in its eighteenth day. There is no end in sight. NATO spokesmen are currently saying that the air campaign will last at least several more weeks. The anticipated arrival of Apache attack helicopters in the region during the next seven to ten days is a major step toward the introduction of ground forces, a move the Clinton administration continues to resist but many other analysts now regard as nearly inevitable. Thus we slide toward full-blown war in Europe. And we must ask, was this not one of the very things the NATO campaign was intended to prevent? From our vantage point here at GSReport, we cannot but agree with Arizona Senator John McCain when he says, "I have every indication that Mr. Milosevic is obtaining his goals and we are not obtaining ours." Indeed, as predicted in our March 25 edition, Mr. Milosevic has endured a horrendous pounding by NATO air forces while systematically pursuing his own ends in Kosovo. Clearly, he is achieving those ends, while NATO's ends seem increasing compromised, their achievement an increasingly distant prospect. If NATO wished to prevent Mr. Milosevic from accomplishing his aim of "ethnic cleansing" against the Albanian Kosovars, NATO has utterly failed. Milosevic's troops have driven at least 500,000 -- and perhaps a million or more (estimates vary widely) -- Albanian Kosovars into refugee camps in neighboring Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. But terrible as the plight of those refugees may be, they are lucky compared to the thousands of ethnic Albanians still trapped inside Kosovo. Nearly all communication from Kosovo is now cut off, but scattered reports indicate that thousands of innocent civilians may be falling victim to rape or murder at the hands of Serb troops; and thousands more may simply starve. It is not clear whether Milosevic has broken the back of the KLA resistance, but clearly he has made great headway in that direction. Of concern to relief workers in the refugee camps is the fact that disproportionate numbers of refugees are women and children -- thousands of able-bodied men are missing, separated from their families, and their fate is not known. Most of these men were likely not involved in the KLA resistance, but Milosevic is of a mind to take no chances. He has accepted the price of NATO bombing to achieve his preferred outcome in Kosovo -- that being a situation in which the drive to separate from Serbia is crushed. Now NATO is faced with a terrible dilemma. Both civilian and military leaders have said in recent days that defeat is unacceptable. "NATO is determined to persist and prevail," declared President Clinton on April 9, echoing a sentiment heard consistently since the beginning of the air campaign. But NATO's challenge now is to define a meaningful victory that can actually be achieved. This will not be easy, and carries with it the threat of wider conflict. In the words of U.S. Congressman William Goodling (R-PA), "Obviously [NATO leaders] hadn't studied much history if they thought a little bit of bombing, or even a lot of bombing, was going to bring [the Serbs] to a peace table." Milosevic's "unilateral cease-fire" announced on April 6 was not a gesture of capitulation but a sign that his own objectives were near to being achieved, while NATO's were not. Predictably, NATO ignored the gesture. Surely Milosevic was not surprised. Nor is he deterred. Some analysts have suggested in recent days that Milosevic may be angling for a final settlement in which Serbia retains the northern half of Kosovo and permits the absorption of the southern half into Albania. Northern Kosovo contains numerous shrines and historical relics precious to the Serbs, as well as rich deposits of coal, gold, silver and other minerals. To date there is no indication whether the partition of Kosovo would be a compromise acceptable to NATO or to the Kosovars. Nor is it clear whether the mineral resources of northern Kosovo are an unacknowledged factor in NATO's concern for the region. Meanwhile, Milosevic seems to be exploiting every opportunity to humiliate and infuriate the U.S. and NATO. A glaring example was the recently failed attempt by Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou to secure the release of three U.S. soldiers held captive in Serbia. Kyprianou, a staunch U.S. ally, was given a lavish welcome by Milosevic on his arrival in Belgrade. But once the diplomatic niceties were over, Kyprianou went home empty-handed. In the aftermath, he expressed anger that NATO bombs continued falling on Belgrade even during his visit on behalf of the U.S. captives. When the U.S. Congress reconvenes on April 12, the pressure to redefine NATO's strategy and objectives, and the U.S. role in them, will greatly intensify. Now that the air campaign is widely seen as inconclusive, the sentiment toward introduction of ground troops will grow. Already, 9 of 11 U.S. lawmakers just returned from visiting NATO headquarters and U.S. troops in Europe on April 9 have signed a letter urging Clinton to consider the use of ground forces. From a strictly logistical standpoint, moving to a ground war would be horrendously difficult and costly. But in terms of its wider consequences for regional and global stability, it is virtually unthinkable. Why then, we must ask, are so many thinking it? So far, the Russians have shown great restraint, and continue to call for a negotiated settlement. But that restraint is almost entirely in the hands of president Boris Yeltsin. All around him are more strident voices, calling for greater involvement. Yeltsin seems to recognize the peril that lies on that path. "I have already told NATO, Americans and Germans: Don't push us to military action, since that will certainly lead to a European war or even a world war, which is inadmissible," he declared on April 9. NATO's options are few in number, and none are pretty. The wisest course, in the view of GSReport, would be to halt bombing now and return to negotiations in the hope of salvaging some justice for the Kosovar Albanians and ending the threat of wider war. But, sadly, that course is the one least likely to be taken, since it could be interpreted as a capitulation. Instead, the air campaign will likely continue, and calls for the introduction of ground troops will grow. Similarly, pressure on Boris Yeltsin will grow, and with it the threat of Russian intervention. Thus all of Europe, and perhaps the whole world, could become hostage to what was, only three weeks ago, essentially a civil war in Yugoslavia. Thus are the great tragedies of history written. Down the slippery slope we go.
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