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Kosovo Crisis: What a Difference Two Weeks Can Make Ambivalence in the U.S. Congress, Milosevic's release of U.S. POWs, G-8 support of negotiations and NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade all contributed to the rapidly changing complexion of the Kosovo crisis.  By Michael Lindemann Start Date: 5/10/99 When the April 25 edition of GSReport went to press, the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia seemed locked on a path that would eventually lead to a costly and dangerous ground war. Now, two weeks later, a great deal has changed, partly by deliberate acts but much by accident. On balance, the change is positive, but it is also highly volatile. At any moment, the Kosovo crisis could shift in an unexpected direction. But if current trends hold, the chances of negotiated settlement will steadily improve. Among the key events contributing to the current situation:
STRANGE DAYS IN CONGRESS A deeply divided U.S. Congress, in a series of seemingly contradictory votes, demonstrated in recent days that Clinton's conduct of the Kosovo campaign has failed to inspire confidence. On April 28, a Republican-sponsored measure that would require Clinton to obtain congressional approval before sending "ground elements" to Kosovo or other parts of Yugoslavia was approved 249 to 180. The vote must be approved by the Senate before it becomes binding. That day the House also rejected, on a 213-213 tie vote, a proposal to support the NATO air campaign, underscoring the skepticism among both Republicans and Democrats toward the NATO offensive. Ohio Rep. Dennis Kucinich, one of 26 Democrats to join 187 Republicans in voting against the air campaign, characterized the bombing as "counterproductive, bombing which has destroyed villages to save them." But the House on April 28 also rejected, by 290 to 139, a proposal to bring all U.S. forces home. The measure was proposed by California Republican Tom Campbell to test the terms of the War Powers Act. "This is indeed war," Campbell said. "We are on the verge of ground troops... The choice really is a ground war or stopping the involvement now." Ohio Democrat Rep. Tony Hall probably spoke for many when he called the choices before Congress "a grab bag of conflicting resolutions about the war. Proceeding in this fashion is an embarrassment." Then on May 7, in another contradiction of President Clinton's wishes, the House approved a military spending package totalling $13.1 billion, aimed not only at financing the Kosovo campaign but also at reinforcing many aspects of the U.S. military. The package was more than twice what Clinton had requested and passed by a lopsided vote of 311 to 105. A compromise spending bill must now be worked out with the Senate; the result, targeted for completion by May 14, is expected to be somewhat closer to Clinton's original request. "That was the strongest expression of support we can give [U.S. troops in Europe]," said House Appropriations Committee Chair Bill Young (R-Fla). Besides financing the Kosovo campaign, the House package includes $1.1 billion for more missiles and bombs, $1.3 billion for spare parts, $1.8 billion to improve troops' pay and pensions, and $1.1 billion to modernize military bases, mostly in Europe. It underscores a widely-held belief among U.S. lawmakers that the U.S. military has fallen on unacceptably hard times during the Clinton years. The trend toward higher U.S. military spending is sure to continue. JACKSON'S GAMBIT While the U.S. Congress was sending mixed signals to every corner of the globe, Rev. Jesse Jackson decided to go to Belgrade and simply ask Slobodan Milosevic to release three U.S. soldiers held since March 31. Jackson went against the wishes of the Clinton administration after being told the bombing of Belgrade would not stop. He traveled with a mixed-faith delegation and several journalists, all of whom knew they were walking into harm's way. "This is a faith mission. We go forward with our hopes and dreams, rather than backward with our fears," Jackson said just before crossing into Serbia from Croatia. On May 2, after a 3 hour face-to-face meeting with Milosevic, Jackson secured the release of the captive soldiers, without conditions. He promised to personally deliver a letter from Milosevic to President Clinton. The delegation and the three soldiers were granted safe passage out of Serbia and returned home without incident. Jackson emphasized that, contrary to NATO reports, the bombing campaign had not weakened Milosevic's resolve. He said NATO attacks were instead having a "rallying effect" in Yugoslavia, bolstering Milosevic's hold on power. Senate Republican leader Trent Lott of Mississippi and Rep. Tom DeLay of Texas both urged Clinton to "seize this moment" to press for a compromise after nearly six weeks of bombing. "Let's see if we can't find a way to get the bombing stopped, get Milosevic to pull back his troops, find a way to get the Kosovars (to) go back in a secure way," Lott said. "Short of that, I see a quagmire that is going to go on. It's going to get bloodier." But others said Jackson had helped Milosevic's cause. South Carolina Republican Rep. Floyd Spence, chairman of the House Armed Service committee, said Jackson's gambit was a "diplomatic victory" for Milosevic. "The world is going to look upon [Milosevic] in a different way, to some extent, [for] releasing the prisoners," he said. On May 3, Clinton met with Jackson but rejected Jackson's appeal for a bombing pause as a goodwill overture toward Yugoslavia, and also rejected Jackson's suggestion of a face-to-face meeting with Milosevic. NATO's resolve was firm, Clinton said; nothing had changed. The bombing would not only continue but intensify, he said. RUGOVA'S RELEASE But Milosevic had another surprise up his sleeve. His decision on May 5 to allow moderate Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova to travel to Italy shocked many in the West who believed that Rugova was a prisoner in Belgrade. Milosevic has reason to fear and dislike Rugova. Prior to the start of NATO's bombing, the 54-year-old intellectual was elected president of the unrecognized Republic of Kosovo by ethnic Albanians who desired independence from Serbia's heavy-handed rule. Without doubt, Milosevic had detained Rugova in recent weeks. Now, analysts wonder, why is Rugova free to travel? One theory: Rugova's visit to Rome on May 5 might signal that he was carrying a message from Milosevic outlining a possible compromise on Kosovo. Last month, Yugoslav media reported that Rugova and Serbia's president, Milan Milutinovic, had signed a joint statement calling for an immediate resumption of talks between the Serb government and ethnic Albanian political leaders on a settlement granting "wide self-rule" with "full equality" for all Kosovars. In his first news conference on May 6 in Rome, Rugova endorsed the U.S. call for NATO participation in an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo and for the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo -- two things Milosevic has consistently rejected. It is possible, however, that Rugova was signalling a softening of Milosevic's position. Rugova then traveled to Germany where he met on May 9 with Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin. After that meeting, Chernomyrdin told reporters that Rugova was ready to go to Belgrade to negotiate with Milosevic on the future of Kosovo. THE G-8 FRAMEWORK In the strongest move toward a negotiated settlement since bombing began, top leaders of the so-called Group of 8 -- the United States, Germany, France, Britain, Russia, Canada, Italy and Japan -- met in Bonn, Germany, on May 6 and adopted a statement of "general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis." The G-8 framework called for:
The G-8 statement calls for creation of a United Nations Security Council resolution covering these elements, thus thrusting the U.N. back into the center of the negotiating process. This is the first time since bombing began that Yugoslav ally Russia has joined with key NATO nations in endorsing "deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences... capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives." Though the wording is vague, it was immediately interpreted in the West as allowing for an armed peace-keeping force in Kosovo, following cessation of bombing, that would include NATO forces. Troops from Russia, Ukraine and other countries friendly to Yugoslavia would likely be included as well. The Clinton administration has previously demanded a NATO peacekeeping force. That position has now evolved to a force "with NATO at its core," a vague concept at best. But no mention of NATO was included in the G-8 statement. Despite the promising step, Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin warned on May 7 that the Kosovo crisis is far from over and insisted that NATO must first end its airstrikes before negotiations can move forward. NATO has ruled out ending airstrikes until its conditions are met by Belgrade. Still, Chernomyrdin expressed cautious optimism after the Bonn talks. "The positions of the two sides have been drawn nearer," he said on Russian television. Meanwhile, Russia's communist faction denounced Moscow's peacemaking efforts, insisting that Moscow should be aiding Yugoslavia militarily against the United States. Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov said Yeltsin's government "is silently betraying and selling Yugoslavia." But Yeltsin has remained firmly focused on finding a diplomatic solution and continues to insist that Moscow will not be drawn into a military conflict. It appears that the spirit has gone out of hawkish calls in Congress and elswehere for deployment of ground troops. The Clinton administration has never acknowledged even contingency plans for a ground war, despite the bellicose language of some in Congress -- notably Arizona Senator John McCain. Likewise, NATO leadership has repeatedly downplayed the prospect of ground forces. It is possible that the cooling in Congress was partly driven by CIA briefings held just before the mid-April NATO summit in Washington. According to the latest edition of Insight Magazine, dated May 24, 1999, CIA analysts presented the House Armed Services Committee with a grim picture of U.S. casualties in the event of ground war. The CIA assessment assumed that the U.S. would necessarily provide the majority -- perhaps 85% -- of a NATO combat force numbering in excess of 150,000 troops. On that basis, the CIA said the U.S. could expect more than 10,000 American casualties in the Balkans. That number was regarded as optimistic by some observers. It is very unlikely that the American people would agree to such losses in this cause. ERRORS, AND SERIOUS ERRORS Although NATO and the Clinton administration have repeatedly stated that every precaution is taken to minimize civilian casualties during the bombing campaign, errors are bound to occur during -- to date -- more than 10,000 bombing sorties, often run at night or in poor weather. In recent days, there have been some tragic bombing errors. With each new incident, widely displayed on international television news, the resolve of common citizens and legislators to continue the bombing becomes harder to sustain. On May 1, a NATO missile hit a bus at Luzane, north of Pristina in Kosovo. Serb TV reported that 39 civilians were killed. NATO later accepted responsibility. On May 7, NATO cluster bombs struck a hospital complex and a market in Nis, an industrial city about 120 miles southeast of Belgrade, just before noon. At least 15 people died and 60 others were wounded, according to Dr. Petar Bosnjakovic, deputy director of the clinical center at the Nis hospital. NATO acknowledged "substantial strikes" in Nis but did not immediately confirm hitting the hospital and market. A later statement said it was "highly probable" one bomb went astray. In the early morning hours of May 8, a U.S. B-2 stealth bomber accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in central Belgrade. Three Chinese journalists were killed, and more than 20 other civilians were wounded. The embassy was severely damaged. Unlike previous bombing errors, this one provoked grave international reaction that could alter the course of the Kosovo campaign. NATO said it had intended to hit a presidential command bunker and a paramilitary headquarters. It was not immediately clear whether the bombs had missed their intended target. But soon NATO acknowledged that they had relied on faulty intelligence data and had in fact targeted the Chinese embassy by accident. The NATO Council expressed "deep regret for the tragic mistake." NATO Secretary General Javier Solana declared, "The bombing of the Chinese embassy was a deeply regrettable mistake." But in this case, regrets were hardly enough. "The Chinese government and people express their utmost indignation and severe condemnation of the barbaric act, and lodge the strongest protest," China's official Xinhua News Agency quoted the government as saying. "U.S.-led NATO should bear all responsibilities arising therefrom... The Chinese government reserves the right to take further action on the matter." Stronger diplomatic language can hardly be imagined. The embassy bombing came at a particularly unfortunate moment in U.S.-Chinese relations. Allegations that China stole U.S. nuclear weapons secrets -- denied by Beijing -- have hardened anti-China sentiment in the U.S. Congress. There are also persistent tensions over Taiwan, human rights, trading privileges and U.S. plans for an anti-missile system that Beijing fears could spark an arms race. Intense anti-American protests immediately broke out in Beijing and more than a dozen other Chinese cities. As crowds of up to 20,000 Chinese, mostly students, paraded past the U.S. embassy in Beijing for a second straight day on May 9, it became clear that the Chinese government was openly promoting the demonstrations, even allowing students to hurl rocks and destroy cars near the U.S. facility. In the southern city of Chengdu, protesters on May 8 ransacked the U.S. consulate and set it on fire. Playing down the incident, British Prime Minister Tony Blair -- perhaps the most hawkish of all NATO leaders -- wrote in the Sunday Mirror newspaper, "Mistakes will happen from time to time." And British Armed Forces Minister Doug Henderson declared, "There was then, and is now, no alternative to NATO's air campaign... That campaign is both right and necessary." But other reactions to the Chinese embassy bombing were less forgiving. The Chinese government intensified its formal protests on May 10 and broke off arms control talks with the United States as a further show of indignation. Japan's prime minister Keizo Obuchi, one of Clinton's staunchest non-NATO allies, was quoted by the Kyodo News Agency as saying, "It is truly regrettable. It is deplorable that a diplomatic establishment that is supposed to have extraterritorial jurisdiction... has been mistakenly hit." Obuchi declared that Japan would work to find a peaceful end to the crisis as soon as possible. He also urged China to be careful to not let the incident lead to a deterioration of relations, because "China has an important presence" in world affairs, Kyodo reported. Russian president Boris Yeltsin called the embassy bombing "a barbarous and inhuman act." Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov canceled a trip to Britain for talks on the crisis. Meanwhile, Viktor Chernomyrdin traveled to Beijing on May 10 for consultations aimed at bringing the NATO bombing to an end. THE REFUGEES Sometimes upstaged but always at the heart of the Kosovo crisis are the more than one million ethnic Albanian refugees who have fled their homes, often with nothing but the clothes they are wearing. According to U.S. State Department figures released on May 10, as many as 600,000 refugees are still hiding inside Kosovo, trying to evade Serb troops, while 700,000 or more now reside in hastily organized camps, mainly in Albania and Macedonia. Some camps are bursting with up to three times as many people as they were designed to serve. International humanitarian groups, along with host governments, are taking heroic steps to assist the refugees, but the flow from Kosovo is relentless, and the tales of horror and sorrow are almost overwhelming. When all else argues against more bombing, the plight of the refugees -- in the eyes of NATO leaders -- is a sufficient reason to continue, until their safe repatriation is assured. But the refugees' plight also argues for the swiftest possible resolution of the conflict, because winter will come all too soon, and with it another measure of desperation. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata warned on May 5 that countries hosting Kosovo refugees must start preparing now to "winterize" tent camps, because many refugees won't want to return home even if the bombing ends. Ogata's warning cast a dark shadow over already worried Albanian and Macedonian officials, whose resources are stretched to the breaking point by the crisis. CONCLUSIONS As NATO's bombing campaign nears its eighth week, pressures are building steadily toward the path of negotiated settlement. For NATO, the challenge will be to maintain the appearance of success while making concessions required by Russia, China and Milosevic himself. The likelihood of a ground war is now reduced to almost zero. NATO must find a graceful way out of the bombing campaign, because Milosevic has shown that he is willing to endure it as long as necessary without folding. The beginning of a settlement, based on the G-8 framework and brokered by the U.N. Security Council, seems possible within the next several weeks. To the Serbs, Milosevic will emerge from this crisis with enhanced prestige and authority. He will likely undertake stronger alliances with Russia and other sympathetic neighbors, complicating NATO's certain desire to prosecute him as a war criminal. NATO, never intending to harm the Serbian people, will feel compelled to help rebuild shattered Serbia. Repatriating the Kosovar refugees will be a long and bitter process. Many could be denied return on the pretext that their identity papers are missing -- stripped by Serb forces when the refugees first fled their homes. Many others will resist return, fearing that they can never be safe while Milosevic remains in power. The multi-national peacekeeping mission, when it eventually arrives, will have to plan on a long stay.
The Kosovo bombing campaign will be studied by military strategists for years to come. It contains many lessons -- mostly about the limitations of even the world's most advanced and merciless air power. But NATO's refusal to commit ground forces, thus forestalling a more grotesque human slaughter, may also be seen in years to come as a turning point in the military affairs of planet Earth. It can be hoped that some good will come of the Kosovo crisis, if we can learn to see it correctly.
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