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Russia Slowly Rebounds; West Remains Wary In Russia, a nation cursed by misfortune, things are finally starting to look up. But Russia's situation remains dire; political instability looms, and Yeltsin's reforms are threatened by reactionary forces.  By Michael Lindemann Start Date: 7/10/99 Russia's deeply depressed economy shows signs of slow recovery in recent weeks, and Russia's standing in the international community is up since the nation took a restrained but firm stand against NATO's bombing campaign in the Balkans. Russian president Boris Yeltsin's health is improved and his spirits are high despite single-digit popularity among his own constituents. Russian troops are on patrol in parts of Kosovo after resolving command issues with the NATO leadership. Strained relations between Russia and the West, particularly the U.S., over the Kosovo crisis appear to be under repair. For the most part, all this augurs well for Russia's increasing integration into the global economic and diplomatic order. But there are trouble signs as well that will keep Western observers watching carefully during the coming year. Topping the list is the question of Yeltsin's successor -- or whether, indeed, he will arrange a way to stay in power once his constitutionally limited tenure in office expires next summer. In recent days, Yeltsin has offered clear assurances that he intends to step down gracefully. In an interview carried by Russian news agencies on July 6, Yeltsin declared that "new leaders, young and energetic and with new governing ideas, must emerge... We need fresh forces to tackle the new challenges of a new century." Yeltsin says he has a favorite successor in mind, but refuses to name that person because, if identified, "he will not be able to live in peace." Answering concerns about a resurgent Communist Party, Yeltsin said he had no intention of banning the Communists -- as some had suggested and others feared -- because "I think the Communists have banned themselves on their own. They have failed politically. They are losing chances of winning elections and of course are in need of scandals and would like to provoke the president into a fight. If they continue to fan hysteria they will be brought to account, not by decree but in court." But such assurances seem out of step with Yeltsin's sudden interest in forming a new union -- or reunion -- with the nation of Belarus. That idea has been on hold for several years, largely because the Belarus economy is in far worse shape than that of Russia. But now, according to Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, an agreement on uniting Russia and Belarus into a single country could be ready within one month. The turnaround has some observers wondering why. Belarus, a nation of 10 million people, has languished since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Its president Alexander Lukashenko is an unrepentant hard-liner who vocally desires a return to the authoritarian Soviet system. As such, he is strongly at odds with Yeltsin on both economic and political issues. Yeltsin continues to champion free market economic reforms and goes out of his way to belittle his Communist critics. Yeltsin also favors free speech and other Western-style political freedoms. Lukashenko, however, would like to put greater restrictions on the press and return to a Soviet-style command economy. Why, then, is Yeltsin suddenly so interested in formalizing the union with Belarus? One interpretation, most favorable to Western interests, is that Yeltsin sees this as a way of neutralizing the potentially troublesome Lukashenko before Yeltsin must step down as Russian president. Another interpretation, equally plausible, is that the union of Russia and Belarus would create a new political entity in which Yeltsin could justify another run for president. It is by no means clear that he could win re-election democratically. But he could invoke some special privilege during the period of national reorganization. Viewed benignly, this might be Yeltsin's way of continuing to hold off his Communist opponents, who might be stirred to higher ambitions with the support of Lukashenko. But it would also represent a constitutional crisis for Russia, and give the Communists valuable ammunition in their drive for power. Without doubt, the reunion will be popular with many Russians and Belarusians alike, who share strong cultural, linguistic and religious ties. Many in both countries believe they should not have broken apart in the first place. But nostalgia for the old Soviet ways, always stirring just under the reformist surface of Russian affairs, could be inflamed by the new union. And Lukashenko has said that he will run for president of the enlarged Russia. Progressive forces in Russia view the coming merger as nonsensical, a step backward and away from greater integration with the West. It is probable, in fact, that the merger proposal would have remained in go-slow mode, as it had been since 1993, but for the widespread opposition in Russia to NATO's Balkan campaign. An enlarged Russia with more overt hardline tendencies may be among the least desirable of all outcomes NATO could have anticipated. With that premonition in mind, perhaps, Boris Yeltsin on July 2 re-opened discussion on ratifying the SALT II arms limitation treaty that has languished in the Russian parliament (Duma) for more than five years. According to the Interfax news agency, Yeltsin told a meeting of top defense officials that START II must be ratified, and a follow-on agreement, START III, must be prepared. The Duma was reportedly preparing to ratify START II earlier this year but backed away in protest over the Kosovo crisis. START II would cut Russian and American nuclear stocks to a maximum of 3,500 warheads each, while START III would further reduce the number of warheads to 2,000 on each side. Some Western analysts fear Russia's announced plans to begin modernizing its military even as it moves toward ratification of START. But, by all accounts, Russia's once mighty military establishment is in poor shape. Yeltsin's government has pledged to increase military spending by 28.5 percent in the coming year -- an increase equivalent to 6.7 billion US dollars. By comparison, the current annual US defense budget is $280 billion. Another measure of the deep problems in Russia's military is the fact that a Russian soldier typically earns less than US$80 per month, whereas Russian soldiers who have joined the peacekeeping force in Kosovo will earn about US$1,000. One can hardly blame them for wanting to serve in Kosovo, even under NATO command. Russia simply cannot afford the cost of upgrading its conventional military forces to parity with the West any time soon. Superficially, this may be comforting to the West, but it also poses a danger. To the extent Russians are made to feel weak or inferior by Western standards, to that extent will the reactionary forces of Communism and ultra nationalism find fertile ground. Only a self-sufficient, secure Russia built on democracy and free market principles can be a safe and reliable neighbor to the West. There are signs that Russia's economy is slowly edging out of the depression that hit bottom last fall. Inflation is down and currency reserves are up. Western economists say that the crisis was good for Russian business in the long run, teaching a new generation of entrepreneurs how to do more with less and become, for the first time, genuinely competitive on the world market. The devaluation of the ruble has had a similar effect. The Russian government is so broke that it has been forced to end economic subsidies held over from the Soviet era. Not long ago, Russia was on the verge of defaulting on its loans from the International Monetary Fund, but the IMF is now expected to provide new loans to Russia because of the improved economic outlook. Western investors are still holding back, but some say there are promising business opportunities developing all over the country. The Russian stock market is expected to finish out the year strongly up. For the average Russian, however, all this good news means next to nothing. Wages are still pitifully low, and many government workers have not been paid in months. Life is reduced to a struggle for daily food and shelter. Crime is rampant. Discontent is both widespread and understandable. Again, it is fertile ground for the forces of reaction. Not taken into account in current estimates of Russia's recovery is the possibly devastating effect of Y2K computer disruptions in that nation. The U.S. State Department, CIA and other sources have warned that Russia is particularly vulnerable to Y2K. See Y2K Looms as Serious Problem for Many Nations. Thus Russia is poised on a knife-edge between hope and despair, reform and return to the past, partnership in the greater world community or isolation and festering resentment. One thing is certain. Russia must not be underestimated in the global situation. Russia's progressive development is good for the world -- her failure to progress could mean trouble for everyone.
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