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China's Threat to the U.S. Should Not Be Overblown Conservative U.S. lawmakers have claimed that Chinese theft of nuclear secrets has given China virtual weapons parity with the U.S., but most experts say such fears are greatly overblown.  By Michael Lindemann Start Date: 6/10/99 June 4, 1999 marked the tenth anniversary of Tiananmen Square. Like Waterloo, Pearl Harbor or the Alamo, the name alone evokes vivid images and feelings. Tiananmen Square. Communist China. Crackdown on pro-democracy students. Shocking atrocity. Symbol of everything in China that is somehow alien and unsavory to the West. By unhappy coincidence, the tenth anniversary of Tiananmen Square also finds U.S.-China relations at their lowest point since 1989. Allegations of spying and theft of nuclear secrets, disputes over trade and intellectual property, human rights and Taiwan -- and NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade -- all have conspired to undermine trust and good will between two of the world's most powerful nations. Chinese officials have vehemently denounced the recent Cox Report in the U.S. Congress which charged China with stealing top secret data on advanced U.S. nuclear weapons and missiles. The report is "vicious" and "despicable," and evidently intended to "whip up a sweeping hysteria," according to Chinese sources. Whether intended or not, it does seem likely that the Cox report exacerbated the fears and suspicions toward China widely felt by U.S. citizens. A TIME-CNN opinion poll reported on May 29 that 46% of Americans now view China as a serious military threat. By comparison, only 24% view Russia in a similar light. It can hardly be doubted that China has engaged in high-stakes espionage against the United States, exactly as the U.S. has done against both enemies and allies for decades. China, with fully 20 percent of the world's population, a unique and ancient culture, and an increasingly isolated Communist government, cannot but view the economic and military might of the United States as a threat which justifies any effort to gain advantage. In this light, to vilify China for its attempts to obtain nuclear secrets is positively ludicrous -- only slightly less ludicrous, perhaps, than the laxity of U.S. nuclear security measures which evidently allowed massive leaks of the nation's most sensitive weapons data over a span of decades. Among the many questions raised by the current U.S.-China debacle, however, perhaps the one most in need of a definitive answer is, Did China's acquisition of U.S. nuclear secrets seriously compromise U.S. and Western security, or not? Despite the nearly hysterical pronouncements of China's more rabid critics, most analysts seem to believe that the real danger inherent in the nuclear losses is minimal. GSReport concurs with this view. By any reasonable measure, China is so far outgunned by the United States that no sane Chinese military official would dare risk a nuclear confrontation. Best estimates suggest that China has fewer than two dozen operational nuclear warheads, compared with about 6,000 ICBM-mounted warheads for the U.S. China's missile delivery capability is primitive and its targeting precision is decades behind the U.S. The fact is, though China's nuclear espionage has been known and noted by the CIA since at least 1984, there is no indication that China has fielded any improved weapons as a result of Western data. It must be realized, as well, that the Chinese would undoubtedly have tried to acquire Soviet nuclear technology with the same zeal they applied to their U.S. efforts. While Soviet targeting was probably never quite up to U.S. standards, Soviet/Russian weapons and delivery systems are generally comparable to their American counterparts. Thus, the Chinese had not one but two entire arsenals to steal from and emulate. Steal they probably did, but emulate they apparently did not -- at least not to any great extent. Why did they not? They probably had the technical capability and the material resources, and at least a good measure of the design specifics from Western or Soviet sources. If they did not aggressively perfect and produce advanced weapons in large numbers, it would be mainly due to government policy or military strategy, not because of inability. To the extent Western analysts fail to appreciate this, they probably fail to understand why China does not pose a serious nuclear risk to the West. On the other hand, despite all the differences and disputes that rankle both the Chinese and the West, savvy pragmatists on both sides understand that "constructive engagement" is the only game worth playing. According to U.S. State Department spokesman James P. Rubin, "This is a two-way relationship.... We believe that engagement serves our national interest in a number of ways," and "they [the Chinese] believe it serves their national interests" as well. In practical terms, that means lowering barriers to trade, building trust and reducing tensions wherever possible, and staying in negotiations wherever disagreements persist. In even the best case scenario, China will undoubtedly continue to do things that the West abhors. For example, the CIA characterizes China as a flagrant weapons merchant, selling to all comers, including Iran, Syria and other repressive regimes. But at the same time -- even in the face of Congressional accusations and embassy bombings -- U.S. and Chinese negotiators continue long-running efforts to improve trade relations. "The United States has major differences with China, some of which will probably never be resolved," says Morton Abramowitz, a former president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Even so, says Garret Gong, director of Asian Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, "The pendulum has to take the right balance between a realistic view of the opportunities and a realistic view of the challenges." As Western observers reflect upon the dark memory of Tiananmen Square and decades of alleged espionage, the Chinese reflect upon a far more recent grievance -- the accidental bombing of their embassy in Belgrade. With few exceptions, most Chinese find it difficult to believe that America's vaunted smart weapons could hit their embassy by mistake. Their doubts are justified, of course. How is it possible that NATO's maps of Belgrade were that far out of date? Leaving the how aside, it is certainly possible -- and there can be no reasonable doubt (from the Western perspective) that hitting China's embassy was a terrible mistake, pure and simple. But it has aroused enormous hard feelings in the world's most populous nation, feelings that will take time to subside. "The anti-American feeling is pretty strong in China," says John Moore, the first Australian defence minister to make an official visit to China. Speaking to the Australian press recently, Moore added, "They have a reason to be aggrieved. If the Chinese had ripped five rockets into some American embassy around the place, the Yanks would be talking big." There is blame enough to go around, as the old saying goes -- and reason enough on both sides for hatred and mistrust. But neither stolen nuclear secrets nor trade disputes nor a bombed embassy have greatly changed the status or the prospects of U.S.-China relations. Those relations will remain strained and difficult, but will also offer great opportunity to those willing to work for it in good faith.
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